

Introduction

CTC

The Counter-Terrorism Committee is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Security Council

In the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1373, which, among its provisions, obliges all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks

Terrorism

Terrorism continues to pose a major threat to international peace and security and undermines the core values of the United Nations. In addition to the devastating human cost of terrorism, in terms of lives lost or permanently altered, terrorist acts aim to destabilize governments and undermine economic and social development.

Addressing this threat is that much more difficult given the complex and constantly evolving nature of terrorist activity. Its motivations, financing, methods of attack and choice of

target are constantly changing. Terrorist acts often defy national borders; one act of terrorism can involve activities and actors from numerous countries.

Given this complexity, strong coordination and cooperation within national governments and between states and organizations at the regional and international level is essential to effectively combat terrorism, to share best practices and lessons learned and to assist with the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases

Topic A

Situation regarding the FTF (foreign Terrorist Fighter)

History

Foreign Terrorist Fighters have increased dramatically since 1980. Standard explanations emphasize Operation Cyclone –codename for the United States' CIA program to arm and finance the 1980s Afghan mujahideen–, the growth of Islamism, and the spread of Wahhabism –an ultraconservative Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship"–. However, the increase in FTFs is better explained as the product of a pan-Islamic identity movement that propagated an alarmist discourse about external threats to the Muslim nation, advocating the unity of Muslims under one Islamic State. This discourse enabled Arabs to invest in the 1980s Afghanistan war to recruit fighters in the name of inter-Muslim solidarity. The Arab-Afghan mobilization in turn produced a foreign fighter movement that still exists today, as a phenomenon partly distinct from al-Qaida.

Current situation

According to the Security Council, terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) and associated groups have attracted over 30,000 FTFs from over 100 Member States.[3] The flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters on a large scale will without doubt have consequences far beyond the areas of conflict themselves. Consequences that will be felt also in countries of origin, countries of return, and in transit countries, as well as across the International Community more broadly. The existence of FTFs seems to have contributed to the escalation and elongation of, specifically, the conflict in Syria. It has also amplified:

- The violence of the fighting,
- The frequency of human rights violations,
- The brutal discrimination against minorities,
- The increase in transnational organized crime
- The trafficking of people and drugs.

FTF have returned mostly in two waves: in 2013-2014 and early 2015. Early returnees were not systematically prosecuted, let alone convicted. This was based on an evaluation of their intentions and the presumption they posed a lesser threat, but also because criminal codes made it relatively difficult to prosecute these individuals. The situation changed radically in the aftermath of the Paris attacks in 2015 involving Islamic State-linked returnees. The perception of the potential threat increased exponentially. Returnees, including women, started being systematically prosecuted. There is also a particular concern that individuals travelling to war-zones like Syria may become further radicalized while there, and may receive combat training, extremist indoctrination and develop intense social associations, generating friendship networks and perceived mutual loyalties that could be the basis of autonomous, transnational terrorist cells in the future. Studies of past jihadi waves show that veteran fighters can play a crucial role in perpetuating the jihadi movement from one generation to another, often starting from their prison cells, where many returnees from Syria and Iraq now serve their sentences. Prisons, having been long considered a particularly challenging dimension in the response to returnees, now indicate increased awareness of the need to enhance authorities' information position within prisons, with the aim of preventing the radicalization of other inmates but also of devising more suitable and adapted reintegration plans. Different detention regimes are applied, from isolation to dispersal among other detainees, but overall the approach is a tailored one with mechanisms to monitor detainees and constantly adjust their conditions. Once out of prison, returnees fall back on mechanisms that were established to deal with FTFs

Main Causes Of The Problem

According to the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, in both developed and developing countries, significant numbers of young people are considering travelling to areas where their personal security would be at risk. The departure of so many young people to conflict zones has a profoundly destabilizing effect on their communities and, above all, on their families. In order to attract individuals to its cause, ISIL exploits socioeconomic grievances and feelings of alienation, marginalization, discrimination, or victimization, precipitated by a host of factors, including real or perceived lack of opportunities, lack of good governance, inequality, injustice, and feelings of injustice. Foreign Terrorist Fighters leave their country of residence for different reasons; many FTFs serving as foot soldiers lack opportunity, are disadvantaged economically, lack education and have poor labor prospects, even when they come from Western societies. These factors intertwine in different ways according to the individual, and the internal and external environment each one faces. Nevertheless, unresolved conflicts that include inter-communal violence appear to be one of the strongest magnets for FTFs. A sense of identity with coreligionists who are perceived as victimized and mistreated by other groups has developed into a sense of obligation to act in defense of one's in-group. Social and personal networks are key mechanisms in the evolution of a FTF. The decision to go to a conflict area is almost invariably linked to social networks formed in gathering places such as mosques, prisons, schools, universities, neighborhoods or the workplace. In more general terms, there is inevitably a "personal" factor that persuades one individual to become a FTF while his neighbor, or even his sibling, although exposed to exactly the same environment and subject to the same conditions

conducive to radicalization and extremism chooses to remain at home. These factors are among the hardest to discover, and although of great importance to the individual, are likely to be the least susceptible to any broadbased intervention at the community level.[8] Referring to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter recruits as seekers, four primary types are identified:

- The Revenge Seeker: Diffusely frustrated, angry and seeking an outlet to discharge that frustration and anger towards some person, group or entity whom he may see as being at fault;
- The Status Seeker: Seeking recognition and esteem from others;
- The Identity Seeker: Primarily driven by a need to belong and to be a part of something meaningful, and seeking to define their identities or sense of self through their group affiliations;
- The Thrill Seeker: Attracted to the group because of the prospects for excitement, adventure, and glory.

Foreign Terrorist Fighters are motivated by a diverse range of factors both in deciding to go to a conflict area, but also in deciding to return. Idealism and the hope for self-betterment take different forms, as does the disappointment and disillusionment created by group infighting, corruption, discrimination, or unmet expectations. It therefore may be important to consider if the criminalization of every returning FTF is necessary. In dealing with returnees, it may be important to differentiate between them based on what they actually did in the conflict area, their initial intention before going and their reasons for return.

CONCLUSION

The counter terrorism committee must come up with solutions for dealing with the FTF and also come up with ways to counter production of more FTF soldiers and fanatics

Possible solutions :

A. CRIMINALIZATION

Ensuring the criminalization –and establishment as serious criminal offences– of all Foreign

Terrorist Fighter-related offences in national legislation is imperative. Therefore, Member States should review national legislation to ensure that criminal rules allow for the broad collection and use of evidence against foreign terrorist fighters. Ensuring, in particular, that

evidence collected through special investigative techniques or from States of destination, or

evidence collected by means of ICT and social media, including through electronic

surveillance, may be lawfully admitted as evidence in cases relating to foreign terrorist

fighters.[24]

B. PROSECUTION

For that reason, Member States should provide training for judges and prosecutors in international counterterrorism practices, particularly those pertaining to Foreign Terrorist Fighters, which

could include the collection and admission of evidence from social media,

financial investigations, special investigative techniques and evidence collected from conflict

zones.[21] Close cooperation and coordination between intelligence, law enforcement,

prosecution and all other relevant authorities, including financial authorities, therefore needs

to be ensured, as well as making certain that the prosecution services are involved from the

beginning in investigations of suspected foreign terrorist fighters.

[25] Member States should

further develop and implement strategies for dealing with specific categories of returnees,

in particular minors, women, family members, potentially vulnerable individuals, providers of

medical services and other humanitarian needs and disillusioned returnees who have

committed less serious offences.

C. PREVENTING TRAVEL

The implementation of measures to ensure the effective collection, analysis, transmission

and utilization of specific information on known or suspected foreign terrorist fighters is

necessary. Through the active use of information contained in multilateral information systems, such as INTERPOL I-24/7 including the Foreign Terrorist Fighter database, Member States can establish an alert system on FTF-related threats and detect, disrupt, and interdict FTF travel.[26] However, a current obstacle is that many law enforcement departments lack access to these databases.

D. PREVENTING FINANCING

While terrorism financing legislation gained momentum with Member States in the past decades, the incorporation of new requirements on FTFs, including on the financing of their travel for the purpose of carrying out a terrorist act, planning or preparing a terrorist act or providing or receiving terrorist training still needs to be discussed.[21] Strengthening the use of asset-freezing mechanisms in order to disrupt terrorist activity is certainly an alternative, however plans must avoid infringing on civil liberties and need to consider the possibility of corrupt government abuse of these mechanisms.

These solutions, however, are just referential and need to be developed in much more detail in order to be presented to the committee.

X. QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMAs)

1. should FTFs be prosecuted for their terrorist attacks
2. If a country doesn't take actions against FTFS should it be sanctioned
3. How can the ctc suppress FTFS through rules and regulations.